The Jubba Agreement: Imperfect Progress

The Agreement between the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and the leaders of the Jubba regions in Addis Ababa on 27 August is a much-needed break from a protracted stalemate between the two sides following the needless death and injury of hundreds of innocent Somalis. That the parties have acknowledged the limits of their powers and the potential for mutual destruction is encouraging. But as ever with such agreements in contemporary Somali politics, the devil is in the details, or lack thereof.

Presumably by design, the Agreement is crafted in worryingly vague terms, falls short on key specifics, and imposes cumbersome obligations to the parties. Crucially, important benchmarks have been delayed indefinitely. This approach is unnecessarily risky. As they have throughout the crisis, conflicting parties may interpret vague agreements to suit their respective political agendas ensuring implementation remains elusive. Sustained progress in Somalia depends upon the commitments of both parties to the underlying objectives of the agreement.

Strengths of the Agreement

The plethora of armed groups remains a potent threat to the stabilization of the region. Article Three of the Jubba Agreement, which deals with management of security forces and reintegration of militias into the Somali National Army (SNA), is an important development. The commitment to establish a joint technical committee to assess the current situation and offer guidelines in this regard is sensible. Equally sensible is the attempt to reach out to al-Shabaab foot soldiers and wean them back into society with full amnesty.

Ambiguity and delay

A key provision of the Jubba Agreement is the establishment of the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA). Article One calls for a deliberative body, to be called the ‘Regional Assembly’, which would act as the IJA’s parliament. Clause 8 requires that the Regional Assembly be a “representative body of all clans and constituencies and selected by the traditional elders with seats been [sic] distributed proportionally among the districts of the three regions in full consideration of inclusivity, balance and in [a] reconciliatory manner.”

In the absence of reliable population data and a recent census, the accurate distribution of seats “proportionally among the districts” and clans is not possible. Representation lies at the heart of Somalia’s political conflict. Use of this language threatens to incite further conflict. Like other parts of the Agreement, sustainable implementation of Article One will rely heavily upon the commitment of the signatories to see it succeed.

Clause 12 of Article Two stipulates that the IJA transfer management of air and sea ports to the SFG in six months, after which the SFG is mandated to appoint a “competent” management body in consultation with the IJA but with funds raised exclusively dedicated to the development of the Jubba regions. This unnecessary delay stalls progress and increases the possibility of the collapse of the Agreement. The signatories could have established a simple and effective management scheme with fewer strings attached and with immediate effect.

Of particular concern is Clause 15 of Article Two which stipulates that the interim agreement will remain in force until “there is a final agreement on revenue sharing in the country”. Considering the pace of progress on the intricate matters of federalism and natural resources, the interim agreement is likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future. The indefinite delay of a final agreement calls into question the commitment of the signatories to its objectives.

Unrealistic obligations

The call for a Reconciliation Conference in Mogadishu within two weeks of signing the Agreement is too ambitious. It is almost inconceivable that a conference of such importance can be organized effectively with such short notice. The laissez-faire approach to reconciliation conferences as a destination rather than a means to an end is alarming.

Clause 22 of Article Four stipulates that during the Reconciliation Conference, the two sides will agree upon “modalities of development of the roadmap for the establishment federal member state.” While it would be encouraging for such an agreement to be reached in the next fortnight, it is neither likely given the depth and breadth of conflict in the Jubba regions, nor legal according to either side’s constitutional prerogatives. The Provisional Constitution assigns the responsibility of formulating national policies on federalism to the Somali Federal Parliament (SFP) and the yet-to-be-established Independent Boundaries and Federation Commission.

Reflections

In June, HIPS offered options for compromise on the Kismaayo crisis. It is encouraging that the outline of the Jubba Agreement in Addis Ababa broadly corresponds with HIPS’ recommendations. The next step in the process is to draft an implementation roadmap with clear timelines to ensure progress is sustained and an independent body tasked with monitoring how both parties honor and implement the agreement. Having hosted the dialogue, Ethiopia secured this role, but it would have been wise to make it broadly representative of the international community.

It is disappointing that the Agreement makes no reference to the ultimate goal of a regional leadership elected by and accountable to its citizens. Nonetheless, following the debacle witnessed in the selection process of the Federal Parliament the establishment of the Regional Assembly offers an opportunity to refine the process of enlisting broadly legitimate and representative traditional elders to support political developments in the country.

A deal on the crisis in the Jubba regions was long overdue. The SFG and leaders of the Jubba region are courageous to have taken this important step sketching a path out of the prolonged stalemate. Negotiations were extraordinarily arduous. Both sides deserve credit for demonstrating the ability to compromise for the sake of the nation. The objectives of the Agreement, despite its flaws, are positive. The commitment to addressing the problems associated with a multitude of armed groups operating in the region is particularly positive.

The Agreement, however, makes several references to a federal system of governance that currently does not exist and is not likely to be fully consolidated for some years. This may render aspects of the Agreement practically untenable for the foreseeable future increasing the likelihood of its collapse. That articles of the Agreement may not correspond with the Provisional Constitution is also a cause for concern – two contradictory legal documents will further complicate an already complex situation. Goodwill and the commitment to the robust implementation of the Agreement are critical. ‘Spoilers’ will attempt to undermine progress and an inherently weak political system exposes the Agreement to numerous threats. Failure to implement the agreement, for the population of the region, however, is not an option.


Heshiiska Jubba Waa Horumar Wax ka Dhiman Yihiin

Heshiiska magaalada Addis Ababa 27-kii bisha Ogosto ku dhex maray Dowladda Federaalka iyo madaxda Jubbooyinka waxa uu soo afmeeray is-hor fadhigii labada dhinac, kaddib dagaalladii Kismaayo ee bilihii Juun iyo Juulaay ee ay ku dhinteen kuna dhaawacmeen boqolaal Soomaali ah.

Waa tallaabo yididiillo leh dhinacyadu in ay garteen koobnaanta awooddooda iyo is- faham la’aantooda miraha ka dhalan kara in ay tahay in ay isla jabaan. Laakiin, sida lagu yaqaan heshiisyada noocan oo kale ah, gaar ahaan kuwa Soomaalida, heshiis waxa uu ka guntamaa ama ka kala go’aa, waa sida uu u faahfaahsan yahay ama faahfaahintu ay uga maqan tahay.

Waxaadba mooddaa in si bareer ah hishiiskaan loogu qoray qaab aan qodobbada qaar kamid ahi caddayn, qaar qodobbada heshiiska kamid ahna siyaabo kala duwan ayaa loo fasiran karaa, qaar kale oo muhiim ahaana lamaba soo qaadan, iyadoo qodobbo qaarkoodna ay dhinacyada waajib uga dhigayaan arrimo aysan fulin karin, ama wakhti ku fulan u hayn, amaa aanba waajibaadkooda dastuuriga ah ka mid ahayn, taas oo ah arrimo laga walaaci karo, keenina kara is-maandhaaf ama in ay adkaato dhaqan gelinta dhammaan qaybaha heshiiska. In horay loo socdaase waxay ku xiran tahay in ay dhab ka tahay labada dhinac taabba gelinta ujeeddooyinka heshiiska.

Qodobbada Dhaxal-galka ah

Caqabadaha hortaagan in gobollada Jubbooyinku ay xasilaan, waxaa ugu weyn, maleyshiyaad badan oo is-barbar yaacaya. Qodobka 3-aad ee Heshiiska Jubba, kaas oo ku saabsan maamulka, amniga iyo ku midaynta malleeshiyaadka iyo ciidamada qalabka sida, waa tallaabo horumar ah. Ballanta lagu qalay in la sameeyo guddi isku-dhafan oo qiimeeya xaaladda taagan, talana ka bixiya tallaabada xigta, iyaduna waa go’aan dhaxal- gal ah. Waxaa sidoo kale wax-ku-ool ah, mabda’a ah in gacan nabadeed loo fidiyo dhallinyarada al-Shabaab u dagaallama, cafis buuxana la siiyo si bulshada dib loogu soo celiyo.

Mugdi iyo Daahin

Qodobka laf dhabarta u ah Heshiiska Jubba waa samaynta maamulka kumeel gaarka ah ee Jubba. Heshiiska qaybtiisa – 3aad waxa uu ku baaqayaa samaynta gole ama baarlamaan goboleed; isla qodobkaas waxa uu tilmaamayaa in golahaas uu noqdo mid ay ku dhan yihiin oo matala, dhammaan beelaha iyo qaybaha bulshada goboladaas, ayna soo xuleen odayaasha, iyada oo kuraasta baarlamaankaas si caddaalad ah loogu qaybinayo degmooyinka saddexda gobol, iyada oo maanka lagu hayo, lagana duulayo in baarlamaan goboleedku yahay mid loo dhan yahay, isku miisaaman, kuna salaysan dareen dib-u-heshiisiined.

Kol haddii aysan jirin xog iyo tiro-koob rasmi, ma sahlana in kuraasta baarlamaan goboleedka, si isku-miisaan loogu qaybiyo beelaha iyo degaanadaas. Gunta is maan- dhaafka siyaasadeed ee Soomaaliya ayaaba waxaa la oran karaa waxa uu salka ku hayaa fashilka lagu guul darraystay in si caddaalad ah loo wadaago xilalka siyaasadeed iyo guud ahaan qaabka la isku matalayo. Haddaba, in hesiiska loo qoro qaab fulintiisu ay adag tahay, waxa ay leedahay khatar ah in la isku dhaco; sidoo kalana, in qodobkaani uu hir galo sida qodobbada kale ee Heshiiska, waxay ku xiran tahay sida is-af-garadku uga go’an yahay ama ay ugu mintidaan labada dhinac (waayo, qaab saddexda gobol iyo beelaha dega ay wax ku qaybsadaan, oo dhammaan ay ku qanacsan yihiin horray uma diyaarsanayn, oo waaba tan Kismaayo ay ahayd gole colaadeed, muddo aan ka yaran inta ay caasimaddu qasnayd.)

Qaybta 12-aad ee qodobka 2-aad ayaa isna dhigaya in maamulka kumeel gaarka ah ee Jubba uu lix bilood gudahood Dowladda Federaallka ah ku wareejiyo dekedda iyo gegida diyaaradaha ee Kismaayo, iyada oo heshiisku uu Dowladda Federaalka awood u siinayo in, iyada oo la tashanaysa maamulka Jubba, ay maaul u magacowdo labadaas ilood, iyada oo wixii dhaqaale ka soo baxana loo isticmaalayo oo kaliya amniga iyo horumarinta Jubbooyinka.

Daahinta maaraynta maamulka dekedda iyo gegida diyaaradaha waxa uu caqabad ku noqon karaa in horay loo socdo, waxa uuna kor u qaadayaa suura-gal noqoshada in heshiiskuba uu bur-buro. Dhinacyadu waxay samayn kareen in ay ku heshiiyaan in dekedda iyo madaarka loo sameyo maamul hufan, isla markiina hawl gala, aysanna ku xirnayn shuruudo fulintoodu ay adag tahay.

Waxaan si gooni ah welwel uga qabnaa qodobka 15-aad ee isla qaybta 2-aad oo sheegaya in heshiiskan ku meel gaarka ah lagu dhaqmi doono illaa iyo inta uu dalku ka yeelan doono hannaan lagu wadaago dhaqaalaha oo u dhaxeeya dowladda dhexe iyo maamul-goboleedyada.

Marka la eego sida aanba weli Soomaali u guda-gelin ama aysan isaga afgaran arrimaha murugsan ee federaalka iyo sida dhaqaalaha dalka loo wadaagayo ama loo kala leeyahay, waxay u eg tahay in heshiiskan ku meel gaarka ahi uu noqon doona midka shaqayn doona mustaqbalka dhow iyo muddooyinka soo socda. Sida loo daahiyey in xal kama danbays ah laga gaaro arrimahaas, waxa ay calaamatul su’aal dul saaraysaa inta ay ka go’an tahay saxiixayaasha in ay xal waara u helaan arrinta.

Waajibaad aan Suurtagal Ahayn

Ku dhawaaqidda in Muqdisho lagu qabanayo shir dib-u-heshiineed laba asbuuc kaddib, waa mid aad u adag; waaba caddahay in shir sidaas muhiim u ah oo dib u heshiisiin ah, in aan lagu hir-gelin karin muddo sidaas u kooban. Waana arrin welwel leh in qaab fududaysi iyo ka baaraan degid la’aan uu ka muuqdo loo abbaaro heshiisyada dib-u- heshiisiinta, kaddibna shirarku noqdaan ‘halla qabto’ iyo ‘halla tago’, aanna lala imaan diyaar garow u qalma iyo daacadnimo heshiis raadineed.

Qodobka 4-aad ee heshiiska qaybtiisa 22-aad, ayaa isna sheegaya in inta uu socdo shirka dibu-heshiisiineed ay labada dhinac isku raaci doonan hannaan lagu dejinayo khariidad ama qaab loo maro samaynta dowlad goboleed. Inkasta oo ay tahay arrin la soo dhaweyn karo in laba asbuuc gudahood arrin sidaas u adag xalkeeda lagu helo, haddana marka la eego dhumucda khilaafka jubboyinka, maan-gal uma eka in arrintaas ay dhici karto, sharci ahaanna arrinta samaynta maamul goboleedyada ma ahan awoodaha dastuuriga ah ee labada dhinac ee Addis ku shiray. Dastuurka ku meel gaarka ahi waajibaadka dejinta siyaasadda samaynta maamul goboleedyada waxa uu u xil-saaray Baarlamaanka iyo guddiga aan weli la samayn ee Soohdimaha iyo Federaalka.

Dib-u-eegis

Bishii June ayuu Machadka Heritage ee Daraasaadka Siyaasaddu soo bandhigay qiimayn iyo afkaaro is-afgarad keeni kara oo ku aaddanaa xiisadda Kismaayo. Waan soo dhaweneynaa in Hesiiska Jubba uu guud ahaan la nooc yahay talooyinkii aan soo jeedinney. Si horay loogu sii socdo, tallaabada tan xigtaa waa in ay noqoto in la diyaariyo lana soo bandhigo hannaankii loo fulin lahaa arrimaha lagu heshiiyey lana tilmaamo tallaabo kastaa goorta la qabanayo iyo inta ay qaadanayso; waxaa iyaduna lagama maarmaan ah inay jirto cid labada dhinac ka madax-bannaan oo hubisa sida labada dhinac uga dhabeeyeen una dhaqan geliyeen heshiiska.

Waxaa wax laga xumaado ah in Heshiisku aanu xusin qodob aasaasi ah oo ah in la helo madax goboleed doorasho ku yimid, shacabkuna xukumaan ama oggolaanshahooda xilka ku hayn kara. Haddaba, kol haddii la arkay qaab darradii ay u dhacday xulliddii xubnaha baarlamaanka federaalka, waa in hannaanka lagu soo xulayo wakiillada golaha maamulka ee Jubba laga fogeeyaa khaladaadkaas; waana in odayaasha xulaya golaha ku meel gaarka ah ee Jubba ay noqdaan kuwo shacabka matala, ahna odayaal dhaqameed sax ah; guud ahaanna waa in loo sii dhawaadaa kobac siyaasadeed iyo in loo tartamo xisbiyo xambaarsan aragti hoggaamin iyo hannaan maamul.

In xal laga gaaro xasaradda gobollada Jubbooyika waxay ahayd arrin xilli hore baahi loo qabay. Dowladda Federaalka ee Soomaaliya iyo madaxda gobollada Jubbooyinkuna tallaabo dhiirranaan ka muuqato ayay u qaadeen dhanka nabadda si ay uga guuraan xaaladdii is- hor-fadhiga ahayd ee ay ku sugnaayeen sanad ku dhawaad. Wada xaajoodkuna waxa uu ahaa mid adag, sida ka muuqatay muddada uu qaatay, labada dhinacna ammaan ayay ku mudan yihiin in maslaxadda dalka awgeed ay u doorteen isu-tanaasul. Heshiiska, gol- doloollaba ha yeeshee, waa mid wanaagsan. In loo is-taago, xalna loo helo mushkilooyinka gobol ay ku bateen malleeshiyaad hubaysan oo is diidan, waa tallaabo qiimo leh.

Dhowr goor ayuu heshiisku carrabaabay maamul faderaal ah, kaas oo aan hadda Soomaaliya ka jirin, in uu si buxda u taabbo galana ay sanooyin qaadan doonto. Taas ayaana qaybo heshiiska ka mid ah ka dhigi doonta kuwa aan la xqiijin karin, gaar ahaan waqtiyada dhow, waxaana ka dhalan karta in heshiisku hir-geli waayo. In ay heshiiska ku jiraan qodobbo aan waafaqsanayn Dastuurka ku meel gaarka ahina waa arrin walaac keeni karta – waayo laba dokumenti oo sharciyeed oo iska hor-imaanaya, waxay sii culaysin karaan xaalad awalba cakirneyd. Ka daacad ahaanshaha labada dhinac nabadda iyo isu-tanasulka ay qaateen iyo si dhakhso ah u hirgelinta heshiiska waa lagama maarmaan; dhinacyada ka soo horjeeda heshiiska waa ay isku dayi doonaan in ay dhantaalaan; guud ahaan xaaladda siyaasadeed ee Soomaaliya ee dhutinaysaana, heshiiska waxay ku furi kartaa khataro badan. Sidaas oo ay tahay heshiiska in la hirgalin waayo ma shacabka Jubbooyinka ay mudan yihiin

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One Comment

  1. Avatar Kenadid Abdirahman
    Posted September 2013 at 3:30 am | Permalink

    Yes, the Jubba Agreement is ambiguous and short on details, however it is a great start and both parties should be complimented for going beyond the constant logger-head that’s become common order of business in Somalia. It’s also incumbent upon the children of Mandeeq, whether in the country or abroad, to support and contribute constructively to such positive achievements however small. She needs us to pool our intellectual and energy capacity to help rise out of the ashes of the despair and destruction it’s been subjected to for the last 20 plus years.

    Those of us not willing to contribute constructively but addicted to “Fadhi Ku diriir”, please leave the – Construction site.

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