

## Policy Brief

09/2019

### The Galmudug Crisis: A Blueprint For Sustainable Settlement

The prospects of a permanent peace or prolonged conflicts are both potentially high in Galmudug. Notwithstanding the political booby traps, there is still a rare window of opportunity to find a comprehensive settlement to the political crises that has paralyzed Galmudug for years. Luckily, some key actors in the state seem to understand the importance of holding *free, fair and democratic* elections in the near future. However, others are preoccupied with, and are scheming to, relentlessly cling to power and maintain relevance while others are obsessively and dangerously plotting to grab control by any means necessary. Some political actors seem to appreciate the value of resolving the various communal conflicts in the region before any election process is initiated. Others, however, seem to be oblivious to the fragility and combustible nature of the state and are driven by insatiable personal interest. Overall, the encouraging optimism in the state as well as the frightening prospects it faces have manifested themselves in the form of the oscillating relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the now emasculated administration of President Ahmed Du'ale Gelle (Haaf) or its supposed successor, Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama'a (ASWJ).

If all stakeholders do not take concrete peace building steps and a long-term view about Galmudug's stability and democratic governance, the current window of opportunity could close as fast as it opened. The key actors in Galmudug's political contest need to be far more courageous and democratic than they have been so far in seizing the momentum and ending Galmudug's perpetual crises once and for all. Although the Somali political elite have a dismal record in reaching compromises and often employ a zero-sum posture towards rivals, the stakes are too high not to find a solution.

Failure to find a middle ground among key stakeholders in the state would, almost certainly, lead to the weakening of each actor, further disintegration of Galmudug and the emergence of fiefdoms run by sub clans. It could also spark internecine conflict among communities, which may not be localized but could spread to other spheres, specifically federal government politics and Mogadishu.

In many ways, Galmudug stands out among federal member states, as it is the home state of the current president and prime minister, the former president and many of Somalia's well-known politicians and prominent business people. Paradoxically, however, the region has had the unenviable distinction of being the most dysfunctional state in the federation.

It has had two presidents in four years. Each president has had a bad relationship with his vice president and the speaker of the parliament—the two other senior elected officials in the state. The armed Sufi group Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama'a (ASWJ) had, until recently, never recognized the state. Most of the sub clans were engaged in active (armed or political) conflict with one another. The FGS (current and previous) has almost always played a negative role, pitting one group against another with the view to weakening its opponents.

#### A complex and polarized state

Galmudug was established in 2015 out of the ashes of balkanized, city-states run by sub clans and various armed groups. It was once home to a thriving piracy network, fueling other illicit activities such as drugs, arms and ransom. Exploiting the vacuum, Al Shabaab also found a safe haven in the eastern part of the state, covering a vast area stretching from Haradheere on the east coast to the hinterlands of Elbur,

The **Heritage Institute** for Policy Studies is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit policy research and analysis institute based in Mogadishu, Somalia.

an ancient city in central Somalia. The formation of the state four years ago was, thus, a monumental undertaking, but it remained deeply polarized. Although the elders of the 11 main sub clans who inhabit the area have meaningfully contributed to the formation of the state, the ASWJ, based in the capital Dhuusamarreeb, resisted joining. ASWJ maintained that its decade-long sacrifices, as the sole bulwark against Al Shabaab in central Somalia, had not been properly recognized. ASWJ wanted to keep its armed wing, ostensibly to rebuff Al Shabaab, and to be given significant political powers, irrespective of how that would upset clan power sharing system. The first president of Galmudug, Abdulkareem Hussein Guled, a close ally of former president Hassan Sheikh, did not want to cede such substantial power to the ASWJ and was therefore not successful in bringing the group into his administration.

That changed when Guled abruptly resigned in mid 2017, barely two years to his four-year term. His successor, Ahmed Du'ale Gelle (Haaf), a former MP and a businessman, immediately began a concerted effort to woo the ASWJ. Months of negotiations ensued, and the two sides eventually had a breakthrough<sup>1</sup> in Djibouti in January 2018. The ASWJ agreed to join Haaf's administration in exchange for major concessions, including the creation of the post of head of cabinet, an entirely new position that was widely interpreted as a co-president. This upset clan power sharing system as both President Haaf and the new premier, Sheikh Shaakir, hailed from the same clan.<sup>2</sup> A peace and reconciliation agreement was then signed in Mogadishu witnessed by the FGS. President Haaf moved from Adaado, the interim capital, to Dhuusamareeb, the official capital, making Galmudug only the second state in the federation to operate from its official capital (after Puntland).

Though the partnership between President Haaf and the ASWJ was supposed to result in a newly strengthened state, other issues continued to dog the fledgling Galmudug administration. Chief among those was a long-held grievance by the Adaado community<sup>3</sup> which had always felt sandwiched between the capital Dhuusamarreeb and Gaalkacyo where both Guled and Haaf are from. Presidents Guled and Haaf had promised that the Galmudug parliament would be in Adaado if and when the administration relocated to the official capital in Dhuusamarreeb.<sup>4</sup>

1 See BBC Somali "Ahlu Sunna iyo Galmudug oo Midoobay" <https://www.bbc.com/somali/war-42733925>

2 President Haaf and Premier Sheikh Shaakir are from Habargidir, the largest clan in the state. Their sub clans are Sa'ad and Ayr, respectively. The two sub clans are, at times, rivals on the political scene. The main district for Sa'ad is Gaalkacyo and for Ayr is Dhuusamarreeb.

3 The Adaado community refers to the Saleebaan sub clan of Habargidir.

4 President Farmaajo also endorsed this position when he visited Adaado in 2017.

5 Hashi hails from Marehan and Asir from Murusade. The two clans have considerable influence in the state.

6 President Abdulaziz Laftagareen was a cabinet member in Khair's government before he was sent to Baidoa.

President Haaf failed to keep that promise and relocated the parliament to Dhuusamarreeb, further marginalizing the Adaado community. He calculated at the time that the ASWJ was the force multiplier he desperately needed to consolidate power in the deeply fractured state and that he could afford to offend other sub clans along the way. That would turn out to be a costly miscalculation.

The Djibouti pact between President Haaf and the ASWJ had other, more worrying, side effects. It effectively made the armed Sufi group the main power broker in the state, both politically and militarily and sidelined the elected vice president, Mohamed Hashi, and the speaker of the state legislature, Ali Ga'al Asir. By pure coincidence, the vice president and the speaker of Galmudug hail from the sub clans<sup>5</sup> of President Mohamed Farmaajo and Prime Minister Hassan Khair, respectively. This made it easy, however, for some in Galmudug to accuse the federal president and his prime minister of partisanship.

As President Haaf moved closer to the ASWJ orbit, vice president Hashi and speaker Asir felt increasingly marginalized, their constitutional and political powers usurped by Sheikh Shaakir, the new premier who was acting as the de facto co-president of the state. President Haaf had meanwhile joined the other presidents of member states in a power tussle with the FGS over a broad range of policy issues. The most consequential of those was the decision by the member state leaders to openly side with the Saudi-led coalition in the Gulf crisis. This was in direct confrontation with the FGS which, despite its neutrality claim, was widely perceived as siding with Qatar.

Protective of its constitutional responsibility to manage foreign and defense policy, the FGS went into an overdrive to take its revenge against the wayward and enterprising member state leaders. It unleashed overwhelming pressure to either unseat the five leaders or whip them into line. The first casualty was President Ali Abdallah Ossoble of Hirshabeelle who was removed in a no-confidence vote in his state legislature. The second was Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, the veteran president of Southwest state, who resigned under duress. The FGS replaced him with a close ally.<sup>6</sup>

In Puntland, the FGS tried to install a loyalist in the presidency during the January 2019 election but failed dramatically, although it derived satisfaction from contributing to the demise of former president Abdiweli Gaas who was a staunch rival of the FGS.

In Galmudug, the FGS orchestrated a low-key political insurgency against President Haaf. Exploiting the grievances of vice president Hashi and speaker Asir (and capitalizing on the pull factor of the clan dynamics), the FGS was accused of mobilizing the two disenfranchised leaders to return to Adaado and set-up a splinter administration<sup>7</sup> – to isolate President Haaf in Dhuusamarreeb, then eject him at the first opportunity.

That strategy came to fruition a few months ago when, after months of quiet negotiations with the FGS, the ASWJ and the FGS joined together to unexpectedly announce that President Haaf’s constitutional mandate would end in July 2019. Previously, both the ASWJ and President Haaf had maintained that they would remain in power until the end of his four-year term in January 2022.

President Haaf recognized ASWJ’s sudden change as an eviction notice from Dhuusamarreeb and decamped from the state capital towards Adaado. Along the way, he announced the nullification of the Djibouti agreement with the ASWJ and, in a stunning reversal of his long-held position, declared that he too welcomed elections and that his disagreement with the FGS was over.

President Haaf’s U-turn set off a chain reaction that demonstrably disrupted any plans by the federal government to hold elections in Dhuusamarreeb without President Haaf administration or other actors such as the Adaado community. A day after President Haaf left the state capital, Prime Minister Khaire arrived in town with a fanfare, only to be deflated by the news that Haaf was, after all, willing to hold elections. The prime minister began a whirlwind tour of the state, crisscrossing all major cities and promising communities that free and fair elections would be held and that a “new, united Galmudug” would be established. That would be easier said than done, but it’s not impossible.

### **The multiple actors**

Galmudug has a dizzying number of actors with considerable sway over the various parts of the state. Of the 10 districts in the state, four are under the full control of Al Shabaab (Haradheere, Elbur, Galhareeri and El-Dheer).

<sup>7</sup> See BBC Somalia “Xaaf oo beeniyey in xilka laga qaaday” <https://www.bbc.com/somali/41409310>

<sup>8</sup> See Al Jazeera: “Qatar to Build a New Port in Somalia’s Hobyo” – <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/qatar-build-port-somalia-hobyo-190820115017622.html>

Each of the remaining six is effectively controlled by a patchwork of militias loyal to a local sub clan. The state was never able to consolidate power, thus remaining perpetually weak and poor. Unlike other administrations, Galmudug does not have a port to generate income. The makeshift Hobyo port barely functions (although Qatar has now pledged to build it)<sup>8</sup>, and the only source of income for the government has been a small tax levied on lorries transporting goods to and from Bosasso port in Puntland to the central regions. The main tarmac road that snakes through the state has numerous checkpoints manned by various militias, each collecting their own tax.

In addition to the 11 sub clans that formed the state in 2015, the other key Galmudug actors are:

### **President Haaf and his administration**

Although weak and essentially baseless (he comes from Gaalkacyo, not from Adaado or Dhuusamarreeb), he is the president of the state until a successor is elected. His greatest influence is the legitimacy card, which will take him a long way. Since he accepted that elections would take place in the state, his most important objective could be to deny both the ASWJ and the FGS total domination of the process. However, on 3 July 2019, he announced that he was acquiescing his authority to organize a reconciliation conference and elections to the federal interior ministry, the clearest sign so far that he is giving up whatever is left of his power to the FGS.

### **The ASWJ**

The armed Sufi group is by far the most powerful military actor in the state, although the FGS is slowly but steadily changing that reality on the ground. For over a decade, the ASWJ successfully fended off Al Shabaab from the areas under ASWJ control, particularly the capital Dhuusamarreeb and surrounding districts, something no other militia was able to achieve. Over the past decade, the ASWJ has made power-sharing agreements with each federal government, but none of the posts and resources doled out have quenched its seemingly bottomless political ambitions. As the only Sufi power center with battle-tested warriors in the country, the ASWJ is striving to maintain influence in the state and dominance in Dhuusamarreeb. It believes it is the only one with a proven track record of fighting Al Shabaab without the assistance of AMISOM.

Over the past few weeks, the agreement between the ASWJ and the FGS appears to be in tatters, as both sides have begun to trade accusations.

In the meantime, the FGS has deployed hundreds of its troops to Dhuusamarreeb in a direct challenge to the ASWJ's longstanding domination of the city. There is a potential for confrontation, as the ASWJ struggles to regain control of their most prized political commodity.

### **The Adaado coalition**

This group is comprised of sub clan leaders from the city and national politicians who have broader political ambitions in the state and in the country. They control Adaado, a strategic city that is effectively the umbilical cord that connects Gaalkacyo (and northeastern regions) to the rest of the state. The city escaped the civil war largely unscathed and continues to have an effective local administration that runs its municipal affairs. This coalition projects its grievances by advocating for Adaado to become the seat of the state legislature. Its objective is to maintain the dominance of the city and extend its influence over the state by campaigning for one of its own to become the next president of Galmudug. Federal MPs are also eyeing their re-election bids in 2020 and want to have a say in how the region's future and leadership are shaped.

### **The FGS**

Although it didn't have physical control over any part of the state until recently<sup>9</sup>, the FGS uses its oversized 'power of the purse' to push its agenda, which is to reduce the influence of its rivals. Its main objective is to install a loyal president and use his administration as a vassal state during the 2020 general election. That is precisely what the former administration of Hassan Sheikh did when it successfully installed President Guled in 2015 and used his administration to prop up its electoral strategy, although that approach ultimately failed to produce the desired results as it ruffled too many feathers.

Over the past two years, the FGS has developed a reputation for unleashing its juggernaut against member states to produce the desired results, especially during elections. Although it succeeded in Southwest at a bloody cost, it failed in Puntland and Jubbaland. For that reason, Galmudug, where both the president and PM hail from, would be a litmus test for the FGS.

### **The Gaalkacyo community**

On 14 July, the Gaalkacyo community concluded a three-day conference aimed at consolidating its political position within the wider Galmudug, which it has ruled since 2015 (and the previous version of Galmudug since 2006).<sup>10</sup> The community demanded that it should be allocated the presidential seat<sup>11</sup>, particularly since the state capital is in Dhuusamarreeb and Adaado is campaigning for the seat of the parliament.<sup>12</sup> The community argued that since Galmudug is comprised of Mudug and Galgaduud, power sharing should be based on the two regions, not on the 11 sub clans. However, that argument will be extremely difficult to sell to the other communities.

### **The Hobyo Conference**

For a few months now, a gathering dubbed the Reconciliation Conference for Habar Gidir has been going on in the seaside town of Hobyo. The declared objective of the conference is to unify the largest single clan in the state—the Habar Gidir—on a common platform ahead of the reformation of Galmudug state. The Habar Gidir clan comprises of the sub-clans that inhabit Gaalkacyo, Adaado, Dhusamarreeb and other towns. The conference objective of sorting out conflicts among these key communities and unifying their voices seems to have gained internal traction as representatives of the Adaado, Gaalkacyo and Dhusamarreeb communities have collectively asked that the FGS delays the announced Dhuusamarreeb Reconciliation Conference. The FGS is ignoring those calls and wants to proceed with its reconciliation effort which could complicate the situation as Galmudug without Habar Gidir is not viable. Of course, all Habar Gidir sub clans are not united in a single voice. The FGS's penetration into the region and near domination of Dhusamarreeb are facilitated by pro-government forces who also hail from these same sub-clans.

### **The other clans**

Each of the 11 sub clans that officially inhabit the state are a major force to be reckoned with and exert considerable political influence. If a single community boycotts the process, the legitimacy of the future administration would be in serious jeopardy. However, there's a sense that three out of the 11 sub clans wield an outsized influence in the state. They are the Gaalkacyo based Sa'ad, the Adaado based Saleebaan and the Dhuusamarreeb dominated Ayr.

9 By end of August, FGS troops were effectively in control of Dhuusamarreeb after deftly disempowering the ASWJ.

10 The previous Galmudug was based largely in south Gaalkacyo and areas dominated by the Sa'ad sub clan of the Habargidir.

11 See SHIRWEYNAHA WADATASHIGA BEESHA SACADWAR-MURTIYEED GAALKACYOTAARIKH 10 - 14 LUULYO 2019, <https://goob-joog.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Warmurtiyeedka-shirweynaha-wadatashiga-Beesha-Sacad-Final.pdf>

12 See SHIRWEYNAHA WADATASHIGA BEESHA SACADWAR-MURTIYEED GAALKACYOTAARIKH 10 - 14 LUULYO 2019, <https://goob-joog.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Warmurtiyeedka-shirweynaha-wadatashiga-Beesha-Sacad-Final.pdf>

The disunity of the three cousins (Sa'ad, Saleebaan and Ayr) is central to the fragmentation in the state as they paradoxically consider themselves both rivals and a family. Together with Saruur and Duduble, they form the Habargidir sub clan of Hawiye, which is by far the largest and most dominant single clan in the state.

Some non-Habargidir clans interpret the fragmentation of the clan (whether conflict induced breakup or strategic splintering to maximize power) as an unfair and self-aggrandizing scheme intended to empower one clan at the expense of the eight other Galmudug clans. The non-Habargidir clans include the Marrehan and Murusade communities whose kinsmen now hold the powerful posts of the presidency and premiership of the FGS. They also include the Wa'aysle sub clan of Abgaal whose kinsman was the former president of the FGS, Hassan Sheikh. Politicians from these clans do not want to cede all principal political powers to the Habargidir as they do not wish to institutionalize a rigid power-sharing scheme that relegates them to an auxiliary and inferior status.

For that reason, the ongoing Hobyo peace conference among the Habargidir sub clans is an important platform to sort out their internal bickering. In the end, the Somali clans are deeply autonomous entities that can't be forced to join a state if they don't feel they have been sufficiently accommodated and treated in an equally dignified manner.

### **External actors**

Ethiopia under the now unseated Tigrayan rulers supported the ASWJ with weapons and money for over a decade, because it saw them as yet another proxy inside Somalia. However, the new Ethiopian administration under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is close to the FGS and is likely to side with Mogadishu. However, the security establishment of Ethiopia continues to favor the ASWJ over all other actors in the state for its reliability and predictability.

For that reason, the statement on 3 July from leading international partners<sup>13</sup> on the situation in Galmudug was reassuring and showed a strong level of interest in blunting the oversized Ethiopian influence in the state. The call for a "broad-based and inclusive reconciliation, leading to a transparent and fair selection of a new Parliament and President free from violence" was not only timely but was a deft way to put the FGS on notice

about a repeat of the bloody December 2018 elections in Southwest state.<sup>14</sup>

Over the past few weeks, Qatar has injected itself as a prominent player in the state. In an unprecedented move, Doha dispatched senior officials from its defense and security establishment to Dhuusamarreeb where they met Prime Minister Khaire and ASWJ leaders. According to official statements, Qatari officials offered to train the ASWJ forces as they merge with state and federal forces.

### **The sustainable settlement**

No one expected that all actors in Galmudug would agree on anything, let alone on holding an election anytime soon. However, the fast evolving events of the last few weeks have led to this unintended but encouraging momentum. Seizing that momentum will require courage and political leadership on all sides. Each of the four main local actors has a well-defined objective about Galmudug in general and the upcoming federal election in particular. The challenge is identifying the common ground and compromise position that gives everyone the confidence to participate in a meaningful and constructive way.

While Somali politicians have a terrible record when it comes to reaching compromises, there is a precedent in Galmudug itself for pragmatic deal making. During the formation of the state in 2015, the 11 sub clans who inhabit the area were prepared to compromise. A number of clans accepted a smaller share of the parliamentary and executive seats than the proportion of the districts they control. Moreover, political actors of the day found ways to compromise, even in the midst of fierce competition for influence and dominance. For example, former President Hassan Sheikh and his team, who were dominating the process of the state formation, were determined to secure most of the 89-seat parliament and win the presidency of the state. However, they faced a stiff challenge from the main opposition group at that time, the Daljir Party. Yet the two managed to negotiate and compromise throughout the process, ultimately leading to one of the most competitive elections at the subnational level. President Guled was elected on razor thin margin (during the first round of the election Guled and the main opposition candidate Ahmed Fiqi received 22 votes each, forcing second and third rounds).

13 See "Leading International Partners Welcome Ongoing Dialogue in Galmudug State" <https://dppa.un.org/en/leading-international-partners-welcome-ongoing-dialogue-galmudug-state>

14 The FGS used all its considerable state power to unseat the Southwest regional leader, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, and to install its ally Abdiaziz Lafta-gareen. As a result lives were lost after demonstrations and a UN envoy was booted out after he invoked international human rights laws and demanded perpetrators of the killings be held to account.

The election of the speaker of the parliament was equally competitive, with the Daljir Party ultimately securing that seat for its candidate.

All this was possible because of the balance of power that existed between all the stakeholders, including sub clans, the FGS, the opposition and others. Such competition is healthy for young democracies like Somalia. However, the consequences could be grave if the FGS intends to replicate the Baidoa fiasco<sup>15</sup> when it abruptly detained a major presidential contender, Mukhtar Robow, using Ethiopian forces within AMISOM and forcefully installed its ally as the president of Southwest, resulting in the killing of some 18 people. Rigging elections in a region devastated by conflict could spark violence and deepen communal divisions. Galmudug stakeholders have the best opportunity to seize the momentum for reconciliation and agreed-upon democratic and fair election in order to shed its checkered reputation for being a polarized polity.

All the stakeholders have already taken positive steps for which they deserve to be recognized and celebrated. President Haaf has shown remarkable courage by reversing course and agreeing to hold elections. He will go down in the history books as the man who chose to compromise for the sake of Galmudug. Prime Minister Khaire also deserves recognition for reversing course after he arrived in Dhuusamarreeb and using a conciliatory tone to reach out to his rivals. He seems to have realized that the FGS can't impose itself on this state. The leadership of the ASWJ must also be acknowledged for their long fight against Al Shabaab and stabilizing the parts of the region they control. Their bold move to join the Galmudug administration in 2018 was a welcome start and their decision to allow Dhuusamarreeb to be neutral ground for the next election was laudable. That they merged their forces with those of the FGS is extremely courageous. Finally, the Adaado community's track record of compromise should not be taken for granted. For four years, this peaceful city has hosted a fractured state with no revenue. A grand settlement in which each community, political actor and stakeholder is consulted with and accommodated is indeed within reach if the following steps are taken:

## Recommendations

1. As the national government, the FGS should play a positive and constructive role in Galmudug by taking the following steps: (a) Politically and economically supporting the grassroots reconciliation conference in Hobyo and giving local communities a space to sort out their differences in a way that brings about harmony. If the communities decide to move the conference to Dhuusamarreeb, the FGS should also support it; (b) Supporting the electoral process by working with all stakeholders, including the current administration and the ASWJ. In effect, this means the formation of an inclusive electoral commission that reflects the diversity of the state and all stakeholders; (c) Helping to create a conducive environment for a free and fair election by avoiding a repeat of the Southwest power consolidation debacle. This can only be achieved if the FGS demonstrates neutrality and deference to local communities. The continued deployment of FGS forces to Dhuusamarreeb could be construed as muscle flexing by other actors. The FGS should ask AMISOM forces from Djibouti, Uganda or Burundi<sup>16</sup> to be deployed to Dhuusamarreeb during the elections.

2. President Haaf and his administration must work with all stakeholders – the FGS, the ASWJ and others to maintain the current momentum and usher in genuine reconciliation among communities. That is the shortest route to free and fair elections and their potential dividend – permanent peace. That would be the best legacy President Haaf could leave behind. His absence from the political scene since he transferred authority to the federal ministry of interior is unhelpful. After all, he remains the legal president as he didn't resign.

3. The ASWJ must allow all actors to freely and fairly compete in Dhuusamarreeb. The presence of armed groups during the election and once a new leader is elected is counterproductive as it jeopardizes the whole process and intimidates other stakeholders. The ASWJ must be prepared to completely and irreversibly join the new Galmudug administration. Their continued parallel existence will be an obstacle to long term peace building. The process to merge their forces with the state and federal forces is a huge step in the right direction.

4. The ASWJ should be accommodated in a way that is commensurate with their long struggle against Al Shabaab and proportional to their geographical influence in the state.<sup>17</sup>

15 See BBC report "Somalia Violence: Deadly Baidoa Clashes Over Robow Arrest" <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46566484>

16 Troops from Ethiopia and Kenya have taken sides in the recent Baidoa and Kismaayo state elections, severely damaging their credibility and neutrality.

17 As of this writing, the ASWJ fully controls only one of the 10 districts of the state – Dhuusamarreeb.

However, such accommodation should not upset the accepted power sharing system and the group should compete like everyone else in a free and fair election. The post of premier, created for the ASWJ in 2018, should be abolished, as it creates an unnecessary and cumbersome structure. It also upsets the imperfect but workable communal power sharing system.

5. The Adaado community should compromise, once again, for the greater good. Their continued demand to keep the seat of parliament in Adaado while the rest of the administration sits in Dhuusamarreeb defeats the purpose of having a legislative body with oversight responsibilities alongside the executive branch. The Adaado community should compete for the presidency and convince others to prioritize them for the top post, much like the Gaalkayo community did in 2015 and 2017. If this community does not win the presidency, they could be accommodated with prominent ministerial and security posts.

6. The Gaalkacyo community should also compete along with all others for the top posts of the state. It should not demand that Mudug is given preferentially treatment. This would upset the largely accepted clan power system which has proven workable, if inherently unsustainable.

7. The international community should immediately offer funding, technical expertise and political support so that this troubled region can hold a reconciliation conference and organize free and fair elections. The donor community should insist on sending observers to the elections to ensure transparency. A small contingent of AMISOM forces (from non-frontline states) should be deployed to Dhuusamarreeb during the elections to protect the voting venue and create a safe space for all stakeholders. Qatar should align its efforts with the rest of the international community as any bilateral action by an external actor would almost certainly attract unnecessary interest from her Gulf rivals and consequently add fuel to an already combustible situation.



Readers are encouraged to reproduce material for their own publications, as long as they are not being sold commercially. As copyright holder, the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. For online use, we ask readers to link to the original resource on the HIPS website.

© Heritage Institute for Policy Studies 2014. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial Licence (CC BY-NC 3.0).